By Stefan E. Weishaar
'This quantity is lengthy late. built-in felony and monetary research of pageant legislation is essential given the character of the sphere. despite the fact that to hold this off effectively, one both wishes in depth editorial paintings to convey varied groups jointly; or one has to depend on the few who grasp either monetary and criminal research to a tee. Stefan Weishaar's research not just seems at a obdurate factor in pageant legislation. He does so in 3 jurisdictions, in specified but transparent style, with transparent perception and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to educational research, this publication can pass directly into festival specialists' selection making, and for this reason additionally in compliance and remediation advice.'
- Geert Van Calster, college of Leuven, Belgium
Cartels, pageant and Public Procurement makes use of a legislations and economics method of examine no matter if pageant and public procurement legislation in Europe and Asia deal successfully with bid rigging conspiracies.
Stefan Weishaar explores the ways that fiscal thought can be utilized to mitigate the adversarial results of bid rigging cartels. The learn sheds gentle on one of the most concerns for reaching cost-efficient public procurement - that's itself a serious query within the context of the worldwide monetary obstacle. The publication comprehensively examines no matter if assorted legislation deal successfully with bid rigging and the ways that monetary conception can be utilized to mitigate the antagonistic results of such cartels. The hired commercial economics and public sale concept highlights shortcomings of the legislations in all 3 jurisdictions - the ecu Union, China and Japan - and seeks to elevate the notice of policymakers as to while additional precautionary measures opposed to bid rigging conspiracies may be taken.
Students and researchers who've a willing curiosity within the courting among legislations and economics, pageant legislation and public procurement legislation will locate this topical booklet worthwhile. Practitioners can see how monetary idea can be utilized to spot occasions that lend themselves to bid rigging and policymakers may be expert concerning the shortcomings of latest laws from a criminal and economics standpoint and may be encouraged via methods taken in numerous jurisdictions.
Contents: 1. advent half I: financial thought 2. fiscal idea on optimum Deterrence and Enforcement three. commercial Economics four. public sale conception and Collusion half II: criminal research five. The Effectiveness of the criminal Regime acceptable to Bid Rigging within the ecu Union 6. software of public sale thought in Europe 7. The Effectiveness of the felony Regime appropriate to Bid Rigging in China eight. software of public sale thought in China nine. The Effectiveness of the criminal Regime appropriate to Bid Rigging in Japan 10. the japanese development region eleven. Limits of financial Theories and Concluding feedback Appendix 1. Europe - an summary of Public Procurement legislations Appendix 2. China - an summary of Public Procurement legislation Appendix three. historical past of eastern Antitrust laws References Index
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Extra info for Cartels, competition and public procurement : law and economics approaches to bid rigging
21 For a model of risk-averse sellers and a discussion of risk in independentvalue models, see Maskin and Riley (1984). For a discussion of risk in commonvalue models see Milgrom and Weber (1982a). For risk-averse buyers see Matthews (1983) and (1987). indd 41 28/03/2013 16:48 42 Cartels, competition and public procurement purposes, the following section presents lessons that can be learned from auction theory with regard to collusion. 22 This so-called “revenue equivalence theorem” does not hold true, however, if bidders do not compete with each other.
While jurists distinguish cartels from collusion (the latter does not require a formal agreement), economists are more concerned with the societal effects and employ these terms interchangeably. Collusion in the parlance of economists – and in this chapter – refers to any form of agreement between firms that has the object or effect of raising or fixing prices and of reducing output in order to increase profits. 95 Industrial economics theory suggests that the mere realization of (large) undertakings’ interdependence and the recognition that the profits of every firm could be increased by restricting joint output is not enough to collude.
Participants may be risk-taking, risk-neutral or risk-averse. 21 Bidding systems with a wide variability in prices, or uncertainty about the actual price to be paid, are evaluated negatively by risk-averse participants. Auctioneers who accurately predict the level of risk aversion in bidders can employ appropriate auction rules to set incentives for bidders to induce them to pay higher prices. 3. , 70 ff. For examples of private-value models, see Maskin and Riley (1984), Matthews (1983), Milgrom and Weber (1982a), Riley and Samuelson (1981).
Cartels, competition and public procurement : law and economics approaches to bid rigging by Stefan E. Weishaar